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DOING JUSTICE TO RECOGNITION1
WILL COLISH
McGILL UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT
The traditional role of justice is to arbitrate where the good will of people is not enough, if even
present, to settle a dispute between the concerned parties. It is a procedural approach that assumes
a fractured relationship between those involved. Recognition, at first glance, would not seem to mir-
ror these aspects of justice. Yet recognition is very much a subject of justice these days. The aim of
this paper is to question the applicability of justice to the practice of recognition. The methodolo-
gical orientation of this paper is a Kantian-style critique of the institution of justice, highlighting
the limits of its reach and the dangers of overextension. The critique unfolds in the following three
steps: 1) There is an immediate appeal to justice as a practice of recognition through its commit-
ment to universality. This allure is shown to be deceptive in providing no prescription for the actual
practice of this universality. 2) The interventionist character of justice is designed to address divi-
ded relationships. If recognition is only given expression through this channel, then we can only
assume division as our starting ground. 3) The outcome of justice in respect to recognition is iden-
tification. This identification is left vulnerable to misrecognition itself, creating a cycle of injustice
that demands recognition from anew. It seems to be well accepted that recognition is essential to
justice, but less clear how to do justice to recognition. This paper is an effort in clarification. 
RÉSUMÉ
Le rôle traditionnel de la justice est celui d’arbitrer des situations où la bonne volonté ne suffit pas
à régler un différend entre les parties concernées. Il s'agit d'une approche procédurale qui suppose
une relation brisée entre les personnes impliquées. La reconnaissance, à première vue, ne semble
pas refléter ces caractéristiques de la justice. Pourtant, elle est souvent présentée comme rétablis-
sant une justice entre les parties concernés. Le but de cet article est de s'interroger sur l'applicabi-
lité de la justice à la pratique de la reconnaissance. L'orientation méthodologique de ce papier est
inspirée d’une critique kantienne de l'institution de la justice : il s’agit surtout d’en souligner les
limites, ainsi que les dangers d’une extension trop large de sa portée. Ma critique se déploie en
trois étapes : 1) Certains comprennent la justice en tant que pratique de la reconnaissance, à tra-
vers son engagement à l'universalité. Cette perspective est cependant trompeuse car elle ne four-
nit aucune prescription pour la pratique effective de cette universalité. 2) Le caractère intervention-
niste de la justice est conçu pour s’appliquer aux rapports antagonistes. Si la reconnaissance est
théorisée uniquement à travers ce prisme, le point de départ demeure celui d’une division antago-
nique. 3) Le but de la justice à l'égard de la reconnaissance est d’obtenir une visibilité. Cette visibi-
lité demeure cependant vulnérable à l’égard du déni de reconnaissance, créant un nouveau cycle
d'injustice. Il appert ainsi que si la reconnaissance est essentielle à la justice, il est moins facile de
rendre justice à la reconnaissance. Cet article vise à éclairer la relation entre ces deux termes.
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The aim of Rawls’ political philosophy is plain and clearly stated: to
establish principles for a just, well-ordered society in an age of rea-
sonable and yet irreducible pluralism. In Political Liberalism, this is
the task posed to political philosophy and he takes great pains not to
exceed its bounds. It is readily apparent, however, that the impact of
Rawls’ work has taken certain elements previously outside of its scope
along in its wake. While Rawls’ main concern is redistribution, recog-
nition is certainly a familiar addition to the justice paradigm that his
work inaugurated. Many philosophers have rightly taken up this cause
to see that liberalism more broadly can attend to the multifarious
social injustices that a purely redistributive response cannot.2
This would only seem to be a positive step forward. That First
Nations in Canada are given due respect for their distinct cultural
heritage rather than merely sensationalized tax differentials may
appear to some to be a logical extension of Rawls’ primary goods,
which are needed in order for citizens to maintain their status as such.
Others, however, may argue that such recognition conflicts with the
role of the state in establishing a neutral ground ripe for individual
political adhesion. Either way the interpretation is sliced, there is lit-
tle doubt that Rawls’ aim for justice raises difficult questions that he
himself had not explicitly asked. What is rather more debatable is
whether or not the responses to these questions must themselves be
posed within a justice framework. Although this framework does seem
to carry the momentum of current discourse, “just recognition,” the
aim of this paper is to gain a critical foothold on the reach of jus-
tice into spheres for which it actually may not be entirely appropri-
ate - and this is importantly to say that it might still be partially
appropriate.
The success of this critique will depend in part on what is meant
by recognition. Given the debatable character of recognition, this cri-
tique is made all the more precarious. I do not intend to work toward
settling this disputable nature of the term. There are, however, some
competing understandings of recognition that have gained more
momentum in the literature and perhaps serve more plausibly as ini-
tial premises in the argument here, even if they aren’t entirely firm
premises. The view of recognition on which I will be relying runs
back to the Hegelian and Fichtian origins of the term as a process
of intersubjective, mutual affirmation, but has been significantly
updated in Axel Honneth’s work, and complemented by studies in
developmental psychology. As much as I will rely on this view here,
I will not defend it here. As a result, the critique advanced here main-
tains an experimental character. Put this way, it asks what is the rela-
tionship between justice and recognition, were this view of recogni-
tion vindicated.
The thrust of this critique is three-fold: 
1. In the first instance, there is an immediate attraction to justice as
a principle of recognition, but which is ultimately unfulfilling. Its
commitment to equality - be it of opportunity, resources, welfare,
etc. - offers an appealing site of recognition that would seem to
skirt dangers of discrimination. But it offers no prescription for
the actual practice of recognition. The fallacy in this argument
derives from substituting the principle for the practice; 
2. justice is an intervention of the state that assumes a fractured rela-
tionship between the parties involved. The responsibility for recog-
nition is then shifted to governments as an intermediary when
recognition is sought and needed inter-subjectively among citizens
as well; 
3. recognition in its justice form establishes a cycle of injustice for
which it provides no adequate solution. In their response to rec-
ognize, institutions of justice must identify, and in doing so cul-
tural images are reified, leaving them prone to perverted forms of
discrimination, thus requiring recognition from anew.
To better conceptualize the intent and approach of this paper, it is
perhaps best seen as a critique in a modestly Kantian sense of the
term. That is, an exposé of the limits and pitfalls of justice, and per-
haps more pointedly, of the dangers it presents to itself, if left
unchecked to freely answer for all the social ills that might confront
political philosophy. From this the hope is to be able to chart out a
safer path for justice while provoking an awareness of the peril asso-
ciated with deviation. While this paper will rest within the focused
aim of bringing this critique to the fore, the ultimate purpose of this
research more broadly is to ask how we may better do justice to
recognition.
1. THE LURE OF JUSTICE 
Before taking up our critical stance in the matter, it is helpful first
to sketch out the notion of justice employed here. For this I do not
wish to offer anything new, but simply to focus our attention on the
subject of this critique, which is for Rawls the subject of justice or
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the “basic structure” (and this remained constant throughout his work
from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism).3 It is thus a fairly
statist view of justice that is being targeted here; “social” as it was
put in Theory, “political” in PL. This view goes back to Hobbes (there
is no justice in the state of nature, but only once a sovereign is in
place to adjudicate intersubjective differences) and applies equally to
Rawls. The basic structure of society enables and encourages fair
cooperation among its citizens. Just as a referee ensures a fair game
of soccer, so too is a third party required in society to oversee the
fair exchanges of its citizens, hence the state and its extended insti-
tutions. We are very much talking about the law, democratic institu-
tions, but also about identifying race on university applications, state
sponsored pride parades and mixed gender hockey leagues; all of
which pose important questions that seek a response from such insti-
tutions and practices of the state. 
The initial question to pose in this analysis is: what is the point
of justice? It is of course an all-too-familiar thought that it would be
nice if people could just get along. This initial reaction to conflict
will even sometimes turn to a more fundamental reflection on how
to coordinate this, expressed in the idea that it would be nice if peo-
ple would do the right thing. Indeed, where this is the case, justice
seems to be of little need.4 But alas we lie, cheat, fight and steal,
and all of this even when sometimes we think we are doing the right
thing, that is, even when we think we are justified. Of course, to
leave justification subjective is to leave the concept entirely void. The
Leviathan is a famous witness to this sort of problem, and it is of
no small consequence that its resonance is felt even in the work of
Rawls.5 Now it is precisely to this type of subjective dissonance - call
it in contemporary terms, irreducible pluralism - that justice is intend-
ed to respond. 
Here we may note a lexical ordering of action: 
1. we aim to do the right thing6; 
2. where this is disputed or not at all present, an impartial inter-
vention will cut and choose our half of the cake for us. Despite
the compelling simplicity of this ordering, it would seem rather
abused, all too often lost in a theoretical sleight of hand that
places institutional justice ahead of intersubjective exchange
among citizens; recognition is taken along in with this reorder-
ing of the lexical hierarchy, remaking it into an object of the
impartial adjudicator rather than the ethical practice of ordinary
citizens. For in the larger ideal of society, justice is something
that we would have to resort to very little, but when we do, the
ideal of justice itself is to be grounded in principles of fairness
that respect the dignity that citizens are accorded as subjects of
justice. We may even say that through the principle of fairness
there is a certain recognition inherent in the very idea of justice.
Christian Lazerri, for example, pursues just that line of reasoning,
pointing out that for Rawls himself “self-respect is the most impor-
tant of all primary goods, that is, the primary of all primary
goods…recognition is the first condition.”7 But to conflate self-respect
with recognition just misses the point on two levels. First, it is true
that claims of recognition are often aimed at a politics of inclusion,
that is, a sincere commitment to the universal, which can very well
be grounded in the idea of self-respect as a primary good to which
all are entitled. But left in this abstraction, it provides no prescrip-
tive programme to remedy the historically entrenched abuses of the
universal that we still struggle with today. “If the theory is truly uni-
versal and independent, presupposing no particular social situations,
institutions, or practices, then it is simply too abstract to be useful
in evaluating actual institutions and practices.”8 It may seem silly to
us now that a term as encompassing as ‘person’ was interpreted under
the Constitution of Canada to apply exclusively to men until 1929.
Yet today we are equally perplexed by the application of universal
precepts that, in themselves, offer no such directions. The campaign
for gay marriage in Canada followed precisely this line of reasoning
and remains a contested issue. 
This is not some surface-level platitude that history plays on loop-
track. Rather, the objection raised here is that appealing to abstrac-
tion is a red herring. The universality of self-respect is relevant for
Rawls only as a consequence of purely hypothetical negotiation that
need not tarry with the complications of empirical context.9 It is a
matter of philosophical thriftiness, far from a sufficient response to
demands for recognition. We need only look to colonial history to
see how blind adhesion to compelling yet necessarily void abstrac-
tions engendered some of the most perverse consequences for so-
called humanist or civilising agendas. A more contemporary exam-
ple can be found in the undiscerning application of Structural
Adjustment Programs that have resulted in disastrous economic fall-
out for many developing countries. Lazerri is right to point out that
due consideration is given to the necessity of healthy social esteem
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in working out a theory of justice, which is to attend to the condi-
tions of modern pluralism. In order for individuals to be able mean-
ingfully to set and pursue life goals and plans, they must possess a
certain degree of self-respect and -confidence, without which such
goals and plans would never attain any value in the first place.10 But
none of this speaks to the actual manifestation of this as a principle
of justice; it tells us nothing about how it is to come about, nor how
it corresponds to actual demands for recognition in their own his-
toricity. It deliberately skirts the technical questions of institutional-
ization or historical and cultural pertinence. It substitutes principles
for practices, drawing on the former’s allure of simplicity.11
The second objection we can raise against leaving recognition in
the abstract is that it quite simply offers no response to claims of dif-
ference. Historically, the politics of inclusion has been at the core of
recognition where marginalised groups would seek to enfranchise the
privileges of the dominant class. It was - and still is - very much an
appeal to this kind of universalisation predicated on the basic prin-
ciple of human dignity. Particularly present in multicultural societies,
however, fears of overbearing, unjust or simply disrespectful assimi-
lationalist agendas manifest themselves in a politics of difference. The
response may be offered here that such a politics can only gain trac-
tion through the same appeal to universal respect for one’s cultural-
ly given horizons, which are so integral to the fabric of one’s exis-
tence that to neglect them is to commit a serious harm.12 There is
some logic here in that even in a politics of difference it is hard to
conceive of how this could theoretically be acceded to on anything
other than equal terms. Yet here we confront a similar problem to the
first objection: it is another red herring that diverts our attention away
from the real meat of the issue by reducing its categorical founda-
tion to a matter of justice. On the one hand, this foundation is impor-
tant to acknowledge. Justice is about fairness in a straightforward
Rawlsian sense of the term and we should not wish to depart from
this ideal. There is a large difference between ‘recognize which day
of the week I take my rest’, and ‘recognize the superiority of my reli-
gion’. On the other, slightly more substantive hand, there still remains
the question of how to respect equally people’s preferences for their
day of rest, and not simply in a way that reduces them to a matter
of calculation and economics, nor saddles claimants with excessive
difference baggage. For this, the undiscerning application of univer-
sal precepts of justice seems ill-equipped. As a result, we find greater
traction in the process of recognition as an intersubjective phenome-
non. We shall return to this idea later.
Let us now take a brief interlude to consider where all of this
stands in relation to the Kantian critique that we are working through.
(Recall that this critique is merely to rest within the spirit of Kant’s
critique of reason; its value is thus derived from conceptual analogy
and not rigorous parallelism.) At the beginning of the Transcendental
Doctrine of Elements, Kant famously lays out the two constitutive
elements of knowledge: “Thoughts without content are empty, intu-
itions without concepts are blind.”13 The Understanding has nothing
to process without the material data of the Intuition, such is the com-
position of our grasp of the phenomenal world. Reason deludes itself
when it bypasses this first step in claiming to speak of objects in
themselves, to which we have no access, as all phenomena are given
through the manifold of knowledge as described above. We may draw
analogy here in juxtaposing ethics and justice in similar fashion to
knowledge and reason.14
Think of the lexical order of action mentioned above: 1) we aim
to do the right thing; 2) justice intervenes when we don’t. Justice
here applies to the first aim where it fails at the intersubjective level,
and it makes little sense to proceed otherwise. The argument that we
will develop in the following two sections is that where this condi-
tion is not met - that 1) should fail - justice does not obtain, and the
consequences of thinking that it does will be shown to be problem-
atic. Thus, as reasoned understanding of objects only obtains where
the manifold of knowledge has been presented, so too does justice
only obtain where a failed ethical relationship has presented itself.
Rawls states, “one can say, in brief, that the circumstances of justice
obtain whenever persons put forward conflicting claims to the divi-
sion of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity.”15 But
why bother making the laborious appeal to an intervention of justice
in this sort of situation when the conflict might very well be resolved
by the parties concerned on their own? 
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2. MISRECOGNIZING JUSTICE: AN UNJUST INTERVENTION
The definition of justice offered above is precisely one of inter-
vention. It would then seem quite paradoxical to speak of justice being
an unjust intervention. Though here I refer simply to the abuse of the
institutional application of justice, where it has failed to meet the
conditions described above. The opposition is not between the just
and unjust in ideal form, but the just and unjust uses of institution-
al justice. To add one more caveat, this opposition does not apply to
particular laws, that is, the material manifestation of justice.16 With
these restrictions in place, we may set the discussion in motion by
asking the following question: in principle, can justice recognize? My
answer is a qualified no. 
No, because justice is not the appropriate site where recognition
takes place; qualified for reasons that we will deal with later. Recall
that its role is to intervene where social cooperation and cohesion are
absent or have been undermined. To this end, it is an objective stance
towards conflict, one that must abstract itself from the situation to
assess it impartially. The parties in turn shift their gaze from each
other, in deference, to the disinterested observer. Now if this were
the primary site through which citizens come to understand one anoth-
er - through governmental decrees, such as the recognition of the
Québécois nation; or court rulings, such as the carrying of kirpans
in schools - then there is left little room to assume anything but the
fractured relationships to which justice is meant to respond.
Recognition, it will be argued, occurs on the level of contextualized
intersubjectivity, that is, where ethics becomes possible. An over-con-
suming justice discourse calls on us to look elsewhere, away from one
another, conferring responsibility for recognition to that which is delib-
erately alien to the very site where it is supposed to take place.
I now want to move to a discussion of the distinction that these two
domains bear in relation to one another with respect to recognition,
and in doing so, we must add one more condition to justice obtaining.
In the last section we said that ethics must fail in order for justice to
be applied. To this we add that in order for justice to be applied, it
must also be possible for it to provide a solution to the problem. The
argument I will now turn to shows the impossibility for this condition
to be met in our current problem, that is, the impossibility for justice
to recognize, and the consequences that follow when we think it can. 
Kant concludes in the first Critique that he had to limit reason to
make room for faith. In turn our aim is to make clear the limits of
justice and make room for the practice of ethics. We will do so in
making use of some of Axel Honneth’s work, while bracketing a good
portion of the rest. 
In his 2005 Tanner Lectures, Honneth attempts to resurrect the
term of reification from the dated iterations of Marxist ideology in
the work of Georg Lukács and apply it to the field of recognition.
The lecture is a thorough examination of the social ontology that fol-
lows from Lukács’ analysis of commodification and its objectifying
consequences for human relations. Further credence is given to the
relevance of this term as Honneth works through various invocations
(with albeit different vocabularies) found in Heidegger, Dewey and
Cavell, all of whom speak to the rudiments of human exchange as
involving some kind of emotive or emotional interaction. The aim of
the lecture is not simply to breathe new life into reification by not-
ing its appearances in admittedly quite different philosophers. There
is a more crucial drive to theoretically fasten down the way in which
it may speak to a politics of recognition, which it is not fit to do its
un-tempered Marxist form. In its original form, reification is a false
frame of social reference that precludes the possibility of meaning-
ful human engagement. Presented as such, “Lukács thus conceives of
his project not as unveiling an already present possibility of human
existence but instead as a sketch of a future possibility.”17 From this
Lukács is able to weave the analysis of reification into the larger
struggle of the proletariat, making it a wholly political issue that
would take the discussion of (a form of) recognition down a path it
has arguably slugged over in years past. Thus in order for the term
to be saved, the more appropriate conclusion to draw is that reifica-
tion is rather a concealment of an already-existing form of social
praxis, as opposed to one which has been obliterated by other, more
destructive ones.18
Ultimately, Honneth is working toward a theory of intersubjectiv-
ity as primary, that is, of recognition over cognition, and he does so
with a rich discussion of both theoretically conceptual challenges and
empirical examples from developmental psychology. Recognition is
thus that which is concealed by an overzealous desire for cognition,
which is necessarily objectifying, and possibly reifying. Here I only
wish to echo his ordering that he refers to when discussing the epis-
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temological debate on whether or not we can have cognitive access
to other people’s mental states: 
The attempt to describe our access to another subject’s mental states
on the model of a cognitive relation does not do justice to the fact
that mental states simply are not objects of knowledge. Even the mere
assertion that I “know” about my own pain or my own envy belies
the fact that I am far too caught up in or “impaled upon” these men-
tal states to be able to claim that I have detached cognition or knowl-
edge of them. In my relations to others, I am not an object about
which I impart information through descriptive statements…According
to Sartre, this asymmetry can only be overcome by conceiving of a
subject’s relation to another person in the same way in which we con-
ceive of the relation between a second subject and its own mental
states. Just as we do not in this case speak of knowledge, but of affect-
edness or involvement, we should not conceive of a communicative
agent as an epistemic subject but instead as an existentially engaged
subject who does not merely neutrally take notice of other persons’
emotional states but is rather affected by them in its own self-concep-
tion.19
The argument is further supported by the value association that must
precede any incentive to cognition. By this Honneth refers to the
process of abstracting from the original context of encounter - be it
with objects or other people - to comprehend the object in question
free from any non-knowledge interferences, that is the contextual
blinders. There must ultimately be an attachment of value to an object
to be understood, which cannot itself be a process of cognition. 
This seems right and I have no desire to challenge it. Rather I
would like to mobilize it and take it in another direction to make use
of its analytical force. Up till now, I have been attacking the amor-
phous division between ethics and justice and the subsequent free
range that recognition is given to move in, out and between them. In
light of Honneth’s analysis, we now have the appropriate justification
to raise our red flag and call foul. 
The first thing that must be made clear on our part, and recalled
for Honneth’s part, is that ethics and justice do not stand in opposi-
tion to one another, and nor do recognition and cognition. As noted
above, Honneth runs through a number of different interpretations of
reification in how it is occasioned and what its result is. Returning
to Lukács, it was suggested that reification comes about when we are
forced to adopt neutralizing stances toward our relations with one
another. But now Honneth raises further challenges in navigating
through the relationship between recognition and cognition, as we
would be insufficiently attentive to equate the latter (which may indeed
be categorized as a neutralizing stance) with the reprehensible state
of reification. He rightly points to the integral role cognition plays
in advanced and ordinary social development. The issue therefore, in
Honneth’s nuanced reading of recognition, is not with the use of cog-
nition per se, but the abuse of the relationship between recognition
and cognition. Indeed, the former was shown above to constitute the
very possibility for cognition to come about in the way it reveals
objects to us that we desire cognize. This leads Honneth to offer
recapture reification in the following fashion: “I thereby mean to indi-
cate the process by which we lose the consciousness of the degree
to which we owe our knowledge and cognition of other persons to
an antecedent stance of empathetic engagement and recogni-
tion…[through which] we cross the threshold to pathology.”20
From this we may sketch out our parallels in the relationship
between justice and ethics, and will do so advancing the idea that the
former inherently adopts a cognitive stance, the latter a stance of
recognition. The first connection we may note is, as shown in the
previous section, a relationship of dependency between justice and
ethics. Certain conditions must be in place for justice to apply, and
ethics - or the failure thereof - factors in on this list. We may make
the connection between cognition and justice fuller by noting that
there are likely other factors aside from recognition we would want
to include in giving rise to cognition, just as there are multiple nec-
essary conditions to give rise to justice. Honneth’s discussion says
nothing of the process of how we move from recognition to cogni-
tion, but only the ontogenetic relationship they bear to one another.
Our earlier discussion mentioned not only the lexical ordering of
ethics and justice, but also the full conditions to be met for the lat-
ter. There is thus a complimentary relationship in that the insufficien-
cy of ethics in certain circumstances brings to our attention an appeal
to justice.
The second connection to draw is the abuse of justice to which
we alluded earlier in this section. Now this connection will require a
little more work to flush out as we need to show, 1) how it is that
justice is cognitive and ethics is of recognition (not just analogical-
ly), and 2) how the relationship between the two is abused, resulting
in an unjust intervention, which ultimately bears the marks of reifi-
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cation as well. To the first point, cognition is a practice of distanced
observation, a detachment from one’s more embodied influences to
gain a rational comprehension of the object in question. Justice like-
wise is a cognitive stance in that its virtue or purpose is based on
an abstraction from context to arrive at impartial evaluation. This is
no better expressed than in Rawls’ original position where the prin-
ciples are developed deploying this very strategy. Individuals there
are deprived of any information that may lead them to support prin-
ciples that favour their particular situations. “The veil of ignorance
prevents us from shaping our moral view to accord with our own par-
ticular attachments and interests. In this sense we look at our socie-
ty and our place in it objectively.”21 Thus at its highest order, justice
is founded on such procedures, its material expression is simply meant
to accord with what has already been laid out in a theory of justice. 
Recognition and ethics on the other hand is a bit more of diffi-
cult match. From Honneth we understand well in what recognition
consists, but a clear definition of ethics is a much less settled terrain
in the broader landscape of political philosophy. The concern here,
however, is not to lay final claim to the meaning of ethics, but to
locate a term that speaks to the intersubjective process that we already
have in mind, and for this ethics would seem to be appropriate, despite
its multiple uses. I hesitate, however, to offer any hints of possible
philosophies that may correspond to the idea used here so as not to
charge the term with excessive baggage that the length of this paper
would not permit us to shoulder. This conceptual hurdle can be over-
come, however, by considering recognition as part of the package that
makes up an ethical relationship. Indeed, we need not offer a robust
explanation of the practice of ethics, but only signal recognition as
one of its composite parts. In order for me to take up a sense of obli-
gation, compassion or responsibility toward another individual, there
must be acknowledgment of the situational circumstances that call on
me to do so. In this sense both cognition and recognition may be
subsumed under the larger set of practices that are justice and ethics
respectively, each adopting the appropriate stance to their practice. 
To the second point, the abusive relationship between ethics and
justice, there is some divergence with the reification resulting from
an overzealous quest for cognition. In the final version of reification
in Honneth’s piece “individuals are moved away from empathetic inter-
activity and towards a distanced, calculating view of each other.”22
But now the abuse of justice is flagged precisely when it prevents
any type of view between anyone, it intervenes preemptively. To invoke
the visual used earlier, the parties of justice literally shift their (eth-
ical) view from one another to a (justice) view of the disinterested
observer. Thus we cannot really say that individuals do in fact cal-
culate against one another through a justice framework. The very point
is that they are removed from any robust contact with one another,
and this includes relations of calculated exchange. Reification comes
into play through the disinterested third party that calculates on behalf
of the individuals concerned. Thus unlike Lukács’ lament of intersub-
jective reification through one-to-one economic exchanges that entail
a masking of genuinely sincere interaction, justice reification cancels
the possibility for any exchange at all. The parties involved are
assumed to be suspicious and too self-interested from the start for us
to permit that they have any contact with one another whatsoever.
This is the essence of de-moralizing human behaviour. Lukács abstains
from assigning moral culpability in reified sociality as it “lacks the
subjective intent necessary to bring moral terminology into play.”23
The rationale of cost-benefit analysis becomes so ‘consuming’ that it
simply establishes itself as the modus operandi of quotidian life.
Justice reification goes one step further in getting in between the pos-
sibility for a greater sincerity to be masked. A Kantian reading of
this arrangement could even go so far to say that such is the ulti-
mate de-humanization, to deny the possibility of ethical interaction,
for him, disinterested action.24
In addition to the de-moralizing (possibly even de-humanizing)
consequences carried by an overzealous justice approach to recogni-
tion, there is the obvious and unfortunate irony for the program of
justice generally. For it is no small achievement for liberals that jus-
tice be precisely the institution that recognizes the universal human-
ity of its subjects through the unbiased and equal application of the
laws of a given jurisdiction. Yet the venture to secure liberal equali-
ty in the sacrosanctity of justice is doomed to fail in its misrecogni-
tion and distrust of the individual capacity to act ethically, the mark
of which being the root of deontological liberal thought. It is as if
the charge against the formalism of Kant was skirted by relocating
the un-human demands of his moral philosophy in the hands of the
impersonal institution of justice, the tragic result of which is the nega-
tion of the foundation on which the entire project of equality rests
in the first place, leaving the possibility for justice to be an unjust
intervention.
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There is perhaps one more presentation note that should have been
mentioned at the beginning of this critique, which is that it is offered
here as a dramatic caution. I do not believe that we have actually
arrived at the point of a de-humanizing practice of justice, but the
theoretical sketches suggested above serve to point to the dangers of
such an abuse. Kant’s critique of reason was a reactive treatise to its
delusional uses; our critique is proactive to the omen of a justice that
claims to recognize, while eclipsing the very ethical possibility to do
so. And although as much as it may appear to be the case, I do not
wish to portray justice as some silent ethical killer that roams fiendish-
ly in between our intersubjective relationships. We may be more
nuanced in our understanding here. The concern raised rather points
to the dangers of allowing recognition to be mediated through
exchanges that fail to meet the demands for the conditions of justice.
But the concern goes even deeper than theoretical speculation on the
conditions of justice and the resultant damages to ethical responsibil-
ity. In the next section I will show reproduction of misrecognition
that follows from a purely justice approach.
3. IDENTIFY THE CYCLE OF INJUSTICE
Up to this point, our critique of justice has rested on the level of
recognition as a process as opposed to an outcome. The last section
shows that, by the very function of justice, it cannot offer a sound
process to meet the demands of recognition. But the outcomes of
struggles for recognition matter too. The argument may be made
against our critique that despite this seeming impossibility of justice
to recognize, government and the judiciary certainly play important
roles when it comes to the advancement of particular groups’ agen-
das, such as recognition. Gay marriage could only be institutional-
ized through the appropriate institution, and this would very much
seem to be a question about recognition. This, however, I believe to
be a dilution of the conceptual utility of recognition. It is true that
claims are vetted through government channels to seek recognition
for a particular aspect that has been thus far neglected, discriminat-
ed against or misrepresented in some fashion. Same sex couples lob-
bied for their recognition as equals under the state institution of mar-
riage because they believed to be arbitrarily discriminated against for
a particular part of who they are and how they wish to identify them-
selves. This should not be confused, however, with a claim to essen-
tializing someone as gay. This particular feature becomes pertinent
after it has already been identified and discriminated against - jus-
tice can only respond to that which has been identified, in this case,
sexual orientation. 
The concern is that the practice of recognition, left to the iden-
tifying role of justice, runs up against its own limits in ways that lead
to a vicious circle of injustice. It can do no more than offer an essen-
tialized view of its claimants, something that may be pertinent to the
particular claim being made, but rapidly slides down the slope from
insufficient to offensive and degrading once removed from the con-
text of justice. But it is precisely the offensive and degrading, among
other things, that lie at the base of misrecognition and all the dis-
criminatory baggage that comes with it. In responding to one claim
for recognition, new demands are spawned from the externalities of
the original claim. This downfall from judicial recognition to hurtful
discrimination, while not a necessary regression, merits some consid-
eration. 
In the introduction of Patchen Markell’s influential book, Bound
by Recognition, he sketches out similar problems to those that I am
confronting here. While his larger aim to explain recognition as a
struggle for personal sovereignty parts ways with the objectives of
the present paper, there is an initial common ground. 
[T]here is a profound irony involved in the ideal of recognition:
the very desire that makes that ideal so compelling…may itself
help to sustain some of the forms of injustice that many propo-
nents of recognition rightly aim to overcome. This irony makes
the pursuit of recognition at best an equivocal instrument of eman-
cipation, replete with double blinds. Movements organized around
demands for recognition may indeed produce concrete gains for
members of subordinated groups. [Yet] in some cases, even appar-
ently successful exchanges of recognition may reinforce existing
injustices, or help to create new ones.25
The irony of this all may be viewed generally as the inevitable excess
our language bears, and for which we hold no control. While Canadian
Prime Minister Stephen Harper may be perceived as offering an hon-
ourable gesture in recognizing the Québécois nation, Albertans or First
Nations, for example, may perceive this same act as undue favouritism;
Quebeckers themselves may even see it as disrespectful coddling or
inappropriate interference with their own self-identity. There is thus
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an insufficiency of our language to live up to the full intents of its
use. But there is a more fundamental insufficiency that even the intents
of our language cannot meet.
The politics of recognition seems inevitably intertwined with a
struggle about identity, and Markell’s sovereignty thesis is quite telling
on this point. Without embarking on the burdensome metaphysical
quest to reveal what identity is, we may at least indicate towards its
ambiguity to suggest what it is not, or rather what it cannot be reduced
to. Herein lies the greatest dupe of justice recognition: even when we
win, we lose. Just as in the case with Honneth’s discussion of our
emotional states, identity poses similar problems of disclosure, and
in turn greater problems for appropriate recognition of that identity.
It may be objected that introducing the theme of identity is an unnec-
essary complication in otherwise plain and simple claims against plain
and simple discrimination. However, the wrench being thrown here
is not aimed at the existential status of claimants seeking compensa-
tion for the Chinese Head Tax. It is aimed at the idea that we have
done justice to their identity by recognizing the injustices they suf-
fered as bearers of it. Such an idea would seem to underappreciate
the interactive and dialogical character of identity as a constructive
activity. This is not to say that identity is but an ongoing process, a
game that can never be halted to regroup and reflect on strategy. The
danger arises once we think that the game is over and we can declare
a winner.
But is justice not precisely about making declarations? Reaching
a decision where none was to be found otherwise? Indeed it is dif-
ficult to imagine it proceeding any other way. Although I doubt many
would see justice as making decisions on people’s identity, nor would
many lawmakers or jurists feel themselves to be performing such
tasks. We do, on the other hand, seem to feel as though they are capa-
ble of meeting the demands for recognition. Yet if recognition is root-
ed in the ongoing struggle of identity relations, then what can jus-
tice do but offer a piecemeal portrait of only those features of one’s
identity that have already been - and will likely continue to be in
some way - the object of discrimination? Of course we cannot expect
the institutions of justice to uproot the deep-seated sources of dis-
crimination, but nor should we expect them to forge into the “vital
human need” of recognition. 
CONCLUSION
The question was posed earlier on, can justice recognize?, to which
we responded no. The answer originally given, however, was not a
straightforward no, but a qualified no. The qualification that I would
like to offer is the conclusion that remains after the above observa-
tions. For no matter the number of arguments that may be provided
against the idea of justice recognition (and there are indeed many
more that are far more sophisticated than the ones above), there per-
sists the idea that the greatest injustices of misrecognition require the
strong arm of the law; that just as justice recognition may be insuf-
ficient to meet the full complexity of identity politics behind recog-
nition, so too is intersubjective exchange insufficient to produce the
necessary change required in institutionalized structures of prejudice
and privilege. After all, is this not what recognition claims are about?
I am largely sympathetic to this view and the last misinterpretation
I would like this paper to give rise to is a thesis against the role of
justice in combating widespread, social discrimination. Justice quite
obviously plays a critical role is this combat, that is to say, it does
do something, even if it is not recognition. I am not prepared to offer
any neologisms for this something, nor did this something serve as
our main topic of discussion - it was epiphenomenal, if anything, to
our greater concern with what justice does not or cannot do in rela-
tion to recognition. The arguments made in the paper were directed
at the injustices that result when its role is not properly adhered to,
and this was contended to result from ambiguities and misunderstand-
ings of what we mean by recognition, in how it works and what it
is intended to achieve. 
The methodological inspiration to clear up these puzzles came in
the form of a Kantian critique, for the very purpose of circumscrib-
ing the proper application of justice so as to avoid the pernicious
consequences of its abuse. In this spirit we opposed ethics and jus-
tice against one another to determine which one can lay legitimate
claim to the practice of recognition, though the bulk of the argument
was rather to keep it out of the reach of justice. The silent premise
behind all of this being that it can’t be both ways. Ethics and justice
are two different practices, involving different actors, proceeding in
different ways, to the service of different ends. When recognition is
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left ungrounded, vulnerable to the sway of sensationalized politics and
the quest for justice, it can as well be caught up with practices, actors,
methods and purposes alien to its own. It seems almost second nature
now to see recognition as instrumental to the end of a just society.
But should we not ask whether justice is the right instrument for
recognition? The hope of this paper was to at least provoke some
deeper reflection on this issue, to ask what it means to do justice to
recognition. 
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NOTES
1 This paper has benefited greatly from comments and suggestions by Martin
Blanchard and Daniel Weinstock. I thank them both wholeheartedly. 
2 See for example, Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Recognition or
Redistribution? A Philosophical Exchange (Verso, 2003). A prior concise iter-
ation of Fraser’s contribution can be found in “Rethinking Recognition,” New
Left Review 3 (2000): 107-120. 
3 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 11.
4 One could make a long list here of political philosophers who pursue such an
ideal, spanning from Plato to Thomas More to J.S. Mill, not to mention the
whole anarchist tradition. 
5 John Rawls, Justice comme équité : Une reformulation de Théorie de la jus-
tice, Bertrand Guillarme, trans. (Montreal: Boréale, 2003), 18.
6 The ‘right thing’ here refers to that which a perfectly sound ethical system
would prescribe so that no two actions that follow such a system would ever
come into conflict with one another.
7 Christian Lazerri, “Le problème de la reconnaissance dans le libéralisme déon-
tologique de Rawls.” M.A.U.S.S. 23 (2004): 172. My translation.
8 Iris Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1990), 4. 
9 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge Mass.: Belknap,
Harvard University Press, 1999), 11, 19, 104, 145.
10 Rawls, Theory, §81.
11 Kant was even keen to this point in a brief passage in the Critique of Pure
Reason (New York: Palgrave, 2003), B 358.
12 See Taylor, “Recognition,” 26.
13 Kant, CPR A 51/B 75. 
14 We part with the analogy to the first Critique at its climax, that is, to show
the proper use of pure reason (or the possibility of synthetic a priori knowl-
edge). I am not concerned here to make any arguments analogizing the idea
of a pure form of justice. The aim is rather to demonstrate the proper appli-
cability of justice, otherwise put, to bring to light its conditions to obtain.
15 Rawls, Theory, 110. The position is more thoroughly flushed out in §22.
16 This consideration is beyond the scope of this paper and rather departs with
our preoccupation over the ‘basic structure’. The only short shrift I can offer
is a deferral to H.L.A. Hart’s Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961) and
his exchange with Lon Fuller in the Harvard Law Review 71 (1958), where
Hart argues against the morality of law. We may think of this is the sense that
a law can only be just if it accords with our principles of justice, which is to
say that the law cannot be just on its own.
17 Axel Honneth, Reification: A Recognition-theoretical View, 2005 Tanner
Lectures, University of California, Berkeley, 105.
18 Honneth, Reification, 107.
19 Honneth, Reification, 120-1.
20 Honneth, Reification, 128.
21 Rawls, Theory, 453.
22 Honneth, Reification, 105.
23 Honneth, Reification, 100.
24 On this point as the defining feature of Kantian humanity, see Luc Ferry, Kant:
une lecture des trois critiques (Paris : Grasset, 2006), 101 ff; as well as
Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Mary Gregor ed.,
and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 55.
25 Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2003), 5.
